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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, we propose a theoretical model which help us to define two possible settings 
where the European “migration competition” could be analysed. First, we analyse the 
scenario in which there are two regions: a receiving country and a net sending country. In 
this scenario we introduce the possibility for each country to increase, by investing 
resources, the level of integration between countries which  consequently reduces the level 
of migration costs. Thus it is possible to capture the receiving country’s trade off between 
investing resources in order to attract foreign high skilled workers or investing on 
educational incentives for his citizens. Second, we analyse the scenario in which there are 
three regions. Starting from the first scenario’s framework, we could analyse either the 
case in which a new country is able to intercept a significant quota of the flow of skilled 
migrants, either the effect of migration competition between the two regions in order to 
attract the skilled workers of the sending country. In both case analysed, the presence of a 
central authority which coordinates the migration and fiscal policies is determinant to 
obtain better results. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The enlarged European Union (EU hereafter) changed migration incentives, and therefore 
many European countries are either alarmed about preserving their investment in human 
capital, either encouraged to implement policies to attract skilled personal from neighbours. 
In this article, we propose an extension of Andersen (2005) in order to describe a 
framework close to this new EU scenario where it is necessary to define a new Brain Drain 
(BD hereafter) typology specific to the European context where the migration policies can 
be used as a "new policy tool" by regions. In particular, we analyse two possible settings 
where the European “migration competition” could be analysed. 
 
Analysing the migration policies of the EU we identify a dual approach: a) internal 
migration of EU nationals has been harmonized at the EU level, becoming essentially free 
by 2014 for the whole EU27. b) External migration rules are not harmonized as they 
generally fall within the responsibility of each individual member state. Furthermore, from 
2006 policies relating to the free movement of workers of the EU-15 states could be 
classified into three categories: i) Keeping the restrictions in place for at least three more 
years: Austria, Germany; ii) Lifting the restrictions gradually, within the next three years: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands; iii) Keeping labour markets 
open/removing restrictions: Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Italy, 
United Kingdom; All countries except Finland have opted for transition periods for workers 
from Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
If we concentrate our analysis on the migration flow from and in the EU, it is possible 
identify three main groups of regions. First, there are the regions which thanks their higher 
productivity of the labour (i.e. higher level of technology, etc.) attract from the other 
countries skilled workers. These ones are defined in this work as receiving countries (ff) 1 
and are U.S.A., Canada, U.K., France, Sweden, etc. Second, there are regions with lower 
productivity and high flows of skilled worker which migrate inside the EU and where the 
mobility of their citizens is increasing thanks their membership to the EU and specific 
migration policies. These ones are defined in this work as sending countries (h) and are (in 
particular, eastern European countries. Finally, there are regions characterized by similar 
productivity of the labour and where the mobility is free of institutional constraints (the 
former EU member) which attract skilled from the sending regions and provide skilled to 
the receiving ones. These ones are defined in this work as sending and receiving countries 
(f) and in some case suffer of a net BD like Finland, Germany and Italy. 
 
In this paper we develop a model which incorporates the interactions between these three 
groups. In particular, the first specification of the model defines a framework with two 
regions (group of regions) with different labour productivity. One is a net receiving country 
and the other one is a net sending country. In this scenario we introduce the possibility for 
the receiving country to increase, by investing resources, the level of integration between 
countries which consequently reduces the level of migration costs. Thus it is possible to 
                                                 
1
 In general, the BD phenomenon is very highly concentrated in only five countries which 
attract 80% of foreign students of OECD area: United States (34%), United Kingdom 
(16%), Germany (13%), France (11%), and Australia (8%). 
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capture the receiving country’s trade off between investing resources in order to attract 
foreign high skilled workers or investing on educational incentives for his citizens.  
 
Furthermore, the second specification of the model defines a framework with three regions 
(group of regions): the receiving region (ff) which is able, thanks the implementation of 
specific migration policies, to intercept a significant quota of the flow of skilled migrants, 
the sending regions (h) which has negative flow of skilled and the receiving and sending 
country (f) which, from one side implement policies to compensate the migration policies 
of ff in order to stop his BD, and from the other side implements migration policies to 
attract skilled from h.  
 
In both scenarios analysed in this paper, the presence of migration policies has an important 
impact on the redistributive policies (between high skilled and low skilled citizens) and on 
the publicly educational policies (investment in education, subsidies, etc.). In particular, in 
absence of coordination we assist to a lower provision of the public good education (in 
literature is the “rice to bottom”) and lower redistribution policies. Furthermore, if we 
introduce three levels of interaction between the three groups identified in the model, the 
migration policies are used as instrument for a migration competition between the receiving 
and sending and receiving countries. This competition has the effect to accelerate the rice to 
bottom. Initiative like the European Commission target of the 3% of the GDP as a 
minimum level of investment in R&D are a possible answer to avoid these problems 
 
The structure of the paper is the following: in the section two we define the statement of the 
model and we define the how the migration policies effected directly the migration decision 
and indirectly the educational decisions of the agents and we overview the European 
migration policies. In sections third and fourth section we solve the model in the two 
regions and three regions specification. Finally, the fifth section analyse the results obtained 
and gives the conclusions. 
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2. THE MODEL 
 
In this model we analyse a world with K states. In each region, there exist two typologies of 
workers: skilled and unskilled. To be skilled agents requires education which implies 
various costs. We describe a two periods overlapping generations model in which young 
agents acquire education, working as skilled when old, or work in both periods as unskilled. 
The population is normalized to unity and is assumed stationary. 
 
Agents are heterogeneous in two characteristics (i,j): j which indexes attributes related to 
skill acquisition, and i which indexes attributes related to the attitude to migrate (see 
below). Let us assume that [ ]1,0≡∈ Jj  and denote the density of the population across 
characteristics j by f(j). Each individual (i,j) is characterized by the (semi-indirect) utility 
function ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ibcjaejiVjiU −−= ,, . Where ( )jiV ,  is the present value of income, ( )je  
is the utility costs of acquiring education (a=0 if no education is acquired as young, and 
a=1 if educated), and ( )ic  the utility costs of migrating (b=0 if non-migrant, and b=1 if 
migrant). 
 
Let us assume that in this economy the only productive factor is the labour (skilled and 
unskilled). Furthermore, the demand for the two types of labour in region k, is given 
by ( )xwwL uksksk ,, , ( )xwwL ukskuk ,,  where: 0/,/ <∂∂∂∂ ukuksksk wLwL ; x contains the other 
important elements which influence the labour demand and assumed constant in this model; 
s
kw  and 
u
kw  are the wages of skilled and unskilled. 
 
Furthermore, we assume that in each region k the government taxes labour income to 
finance a given level of public consumption, education and education subsidies2. The tax 
rate on unskilled is symbolized by skt  and 
u
kt . Moreover, by assuming that 
u
k
s
k tt >  if 
u
k
s
k ww >  these two variables capture the progression in the taxation and so all possible 
redistribution policies. See below furthermore details on the government’s policies. 
 
2.2 Education 
 
A young agent chooses to be educated if ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
r
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, 
where ks  is the educational cost financed by government k (i.e. grant to students, 
investment in public education, etc.) and ( )je  denotes utility costs of acquiring skills 
(effort, ability etc). Let us assume that agents are ordered such that ( )je  is increasing in j. 
                                                 
2
 In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Poland the totality of the tertiary education is 
provided by government Moreover in Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland 
Italy, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Sweden we have al least the 80% of tertiary education 
publicly .financed. Finally, In Hungary, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom the share 
is from 70 to 80 % (OECD 2004). 
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Finally, r denotes the shadow price of borrowing in the capital market. It follows that the 
marginal worker which decides to acquire skills, Jjk ∈*  is given by the condition 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
r
tw
tw
r
twjes
u
k
u
ku
k
u
k
s
k
s
k
kk
+
−
+−=
+
−
+−
1
11
1
1*
.     [1] 
 
Therefore, ( )djjfk
j
k ∫=
*
0
λ , defines the fraction of the population which becomes educated 
and kλ−1  the fraction of unskilled workers. Let us assume that exist an interior solution. 
 
Note that the government is able to influence the private decision to be educated either by 
implementing educational policies by increasing/decreasing the provision of the public 
good education ( 0/ >∂∂ kk sλ ), either by implementing taxation policies ( 0/ >∂∂ ukk tλ  
and 0/ <∂∂ skk tλ ). 
 
2.3 Migration 
 
Let us assume that only the old skilled workers are entitled to migrate3. An old agent does 
not migrate if ( ) ( ) ( )mictwtw ksfsfsksk ,11 −−≥− , where ( )sfsf tw −1  shows the after tax 
income available in a foreign country and ( )mic k ,  gives the utility loss of migration 
(tangible and intangible costs, language adaptation, integration, etc.), where the variable m 
is an indicator for integration between countries. Let us assume that 0/ <∂∂ mc , i.e. the 
higher m the more internationally integrated the region, and the utility costs of migration 
are assumed to be non-increasing in this indicator for all individuals. Let us define ( )*kkk jjih ≤  the density for characteristics i conditional on the individual choosing to 
become educated, that this function is increasing in i and let us assume that the marginally 
educated is not the marginal migrant ( ** kk ji < ). It follows that the marginal skilled worker 
which decides to stay at home is given by the condition 
 ( ) ( ) ( )mictwtw ksfsfsksk ,11 *−−=−   .     [2] 
 
It is equivalent to assume that the migration cost for the unskilled are too high and not 
compensate the eventually higher wage that he could receive migrating abroad. 
Therefore, ( )djjjihki kkkk ∫ ≤=
*
0
*µ , defines the fraction of the skilled which remain at home 
and kµ−1  the fraction of migrants. 
 
                                                 
3
 It is equivalent to assume that the migration cost for the unskilled are too high and not 
compensate the eventually higher wage that he could receive migrating abroad. In this way 
we can focus our analysis on the skilled migration. 
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Finally, let us define the policies migration. Let us assume that m is function of the different 
migration policies of the regions4.  
 
∑+=
K
kmmm 10
.   .     [3] 
 
Note that the government is able to influence the individual decision to migrate either by 
implementing migration policies by increasing/decreasing the investment in integration of 
migrants ( 0/ <∂∂ mkµ ), either by implementing taxation policies 
( 0/ <∂∂ skk tµ , 0/ >∂∂ sfk tµ ). 
 
In general, the migration policies often integrate by fiscal policies, focus on the individual 
motivation to migrate by generating individual incentives or by decreasing the migration 
costs. Let us analyse in the following paragraphs some examples of policies implemented in 
Europe which is included in m. 
 
Because, the lack of knowledge of the local language is a problem, particularly for less 
widely used languages and can hamper the social integration, some countries like Greece 
and Germany, provide easier access to fast-track language courses. Likewise, in some 
countries, e.g. Luxembourg and Finland, special language and cultural support is offered to 
accompanying children both in the foreign and mother tongues. 
 
Furthermore, some policies provided incentives and facilitations to the Researcher’s family: 
For researchers moving with their family, the partner's career, children's education or day-
care, suitable accommodation and obligations remaining in the home country (such as rent 
or mortgage payments, or care of elderly parents) may all pose barriers for the mobility. 
Furthermore, in some countries, e.g. Finland and Greece, the researcher’s family is taken 
into account when granting funding for stays abroad. Finally, in Finland and Sweden, all 
children have the right by law to day-care.  
 
Moreover, some policies are directly addressed to the researchers and theirs career by the 
provision of incentives and facilitation. There are several examples of policies that help 
researchers to avoid several problems (access to information about rules and regulations, 
administrative procedures, etc.). For instance in Belgium, replacement costs for researchers 
on sabbaticals are covered, furthermore, in a Greek research institute, to integrate foreign 
scientists into the local research environment is used the method to encourage their 
participation in the decision making of the host institution. Finally, in certain countries, 
foreign researchers recruited to a university may have transition periods, during which they 
may teach in a foreign language, before being obliged to teach in the local language.  
 
Furthermore, there are several examples of grant and scholarships, tax and salaries and 
specific marketing and recruiting policies used by several European regions ad specific 
instrument to attract skilled workers5. 
 
                                                 
4
 By assumption, these migration policies increase only the mobility of the skilled workers. 
5
 Let see the conclusion for specific examples of these policies. 
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3 TWO REGIONS’ MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Let us assume that there exist two regions6 Let us define h the net-sending region and f the 
net-receiving country. According the previous sections, the labour market equilibrium is ( ) kkuksksk xwwL λµ=,,  for the net-sending regions, ( ) ( ) fkkufsfsf xwwL λλµ +−= 1,,  for the 
pure receiving country and ( ) ( )kukskuk xwwL λ−= 12,, , with k=h,f. 
 
Furthermore, we define the public budget constraint of the two regions 
 
( ) hhhhuhuhhshshhh msgtwtw ϑλλµλ ++=−+ 12   .   [4] 
 
( )( ) ( ) ffffufuffsfsffhh msgtwtw ϑλλλµλ ++=−++− 121     [5] 
 
The LHS gives the revenue from taxing skilled and unskilled workers, and the RHS the 
expenditures to public consumption (exogenous by assumption), and the educational 
subsidies/expenditures (endogenous) for the fraction of the population becoming educated. 
It is straightforward that the receiving region f is able to tax an higher basin of skilled 
workers thanks migration flows and increase the available resources that could be used to 
implement educational, redistributive and migration policies.  
 
3.1 increasing in the mobility – Brain Drain policies 
 
Let us analyse the effect of migration policies inside this economy with two regions. Let us 
assume that the receiving region implement new migration policies7 as we show in the 
previous section.  
To analyse better the effect of these policies, let us study a given stationary equilibrium { }kkukskuksk ttww µλ ,,,,,  with k=h , f and where 1,0 << kk µλ .  
 
Furthermore, we assume that the region f  increases the integration by increasing km  such 
that 0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
km
m
m
cdc , the costs of migration are decreasing for all the skilled workers.  
Let us now considered which policy changes are needed to maintain unchanged migration 
(unchanged kµ ) and unchanged educational incentives (unchanged kλ ). This analysis help 
us to identify the relationships between the migration policies and the educational and 
redistributive policies. Moreover, by studying the model in a stable equilibrium, we 
simplify the analysis because if migration flows are unaffected so will the supply of both 
skilled and unskilled workers, and therefore the wage rates will be unaffected.  
 
                                                 
6
 The analysis could be extended to two groups of region with the same productivity 
characteristics inside the groups i.e. the former EU and the new entrants.  
7
 This assumption is a strong innovation respect Andersen (2005) where the migration 
barriers are considered exogenous variables and not possible tool of government’s policy. 
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Let us study the condition to have in region h, unchanged education incentives (equation 6), 
unchanged migration incentives (equation 7) and budget balance constraint applied by 
analysing respectively equations (1), (2) and (4). 
 
( )
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

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w
w
m
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s
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*
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
∂
∂
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

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∂
m
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u
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s
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Therefore, solving the system given by equation (6) –(7), we derive 
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or, computing 
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Let us analyse the Balance Constraint of region f  and the unchanged education incentives. 
The policies of region h maintain unchanged the migration and, in this section, we assume 
that the fiscal policies are not used by region f to attract skilled. 
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Therefore, solving the system 
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Let us study two possible scenario: a) Government of f does not change the tax to educated 
and consequently the only policies implemented is the migration one; b) Government of f 
does not change the tax to non-educated. And consequently the region is forced to increase 
the tax to the skilled workers. 
 
Scenario a (only migration policies) 0=∂
∂
m
t sf
. 
In the first case, by the equation (13), implies that 
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The government of f compensates the increasing cost in migration policies (given by ϑ ) by 
increasing the taxation of .unskilled and by decreasing the provision of public education. In 
particular, higher is the quota of skilled workers of f, lower is the increasing in the unskilled 
taxation and the decreasing of publicly education.  
 
Let us study in this scenario the region h by studying the system (10) when 0=∂
∂
m
t sf
. 
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These results are the same obtained by Andersen (2005). According to him let us study the 
sign of the three variables. 
By definition, ( ) 0,* <
∂
∂
m
mic k
 then 0<∂
∂
m
t sh
. The sending region h, in order to compensate 
lower barriers to migration, has to decreasing the taxation of skilled workers. 
 
Furthermore, the sign of the provision of the public good education is given by 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) 




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+−+
−
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λ
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1121 . In particular, if ( ) ( ) 112
2
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

+−
+ hh
r
r
λµ  (i.e. the initial 
level of migration and /or the quota of skilled is not too large) then lower barriers to 
migration imply 0<∂
∂
m
sh
. 
 
Finally, the sign of the tax to unskilled is given by ( )( )( )( )h
hh
rr
r
λ
µλ
−+
+−
12
11
. In particular, the 
denominator is always positive, than if ( )rh +< 1
1µ  (i.e. the initial level of migration is not 
too large) then lower barriers to migration imply that 0>∂
∂
m
t uh
. Note that the more costly it 
is to acquire education (the higher r), the worse is the redistribution of resource to the 
unskilled. 
 
Scenario b (migration policies and redistributive constraints) 0=∂
∂
m
t uf
. 
In the second case, by the equation (13), implies that 
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The government of f compensates the increasing cost in migration policies by increasing 
the taxation of .skilled and by increasing the provision of public education. In particular, 
higher is the quota of skilled workers in f (natives and foreign), lower is the increasing in 
the skilled taxation and the increasing of publicly education.  
 
Let us study in this scenario the region h by studying the system (10) when 0≠∂
∂
m
t sf
. 
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These results are not analysed in Andersen (2005). Let us study the sign of the three 
variables. In particular, the sign of these variables is the opposite of the previous case when 
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 (i.e. the increasing in the taxation of the foreign 
region cover the decreasing migration costs). In this case 0>∂
∂
m
t sh
, 0>∂
∂
m
sh
 if 
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
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+ hh
r
r
λµ  and 0<∂
∂
m
t uh
 if ( )rh +< 1
1µ . Otherwise, the sign is the same 
found before an the difference is on the amount of these variations (all are lower than the 
previous case because the tax policies of f absorb part of the effect of lower barriers to 
migration). 
 
4 THREE REGIONS’ MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 
In this section we extend our analysis by assuming the existence of three regions8 Let us 
introduce a new region ff that, given same conditions (see below) is able to attract skilled 
from region f.  
Let us analyse the migration flow between region f and ff. Higher is the labour productivity 
of the skilled work and lower is the rate of tax on their wage, higher is the quota of skilled 
which will migrate. Analysing the European data we find strong difference between UE and 
we can distinguish between two groups of European regions with higher and lower 
productivity9. 
 
Rewriting equation (2) we identifies three possible migration scenarios when  
( )mic
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,
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+<=>                  [18] 
In the first case region f attract skilled workers from region ff, in the second case there is not 
migration between the two regions, in the third case is the region ff the pure receiving 
country. The second case implies the same results seen in the previous section with two 
only two regions. The first and third case are symmetric, so we study only the third case 
and we will extend the results to the first one. Let us assume, to simplify the analysis, that 
the skilled from region h migrate only in region f. In this way, it is possible assume that 
both receiving country invest in migration policies (for simplicity the same investment m) 
and so compare the solutions of the three region’s case to the ones of the two region’s case. 
 
According the previous sections, the labour market equilibrium is the same for the sending 
region, is ( ) ( ) ( ) ffkkufsfsf xwwL λµλµ −+−= 11,,  for the sending and receiving country, 
( ) ( ) fffuffsffsff xwwL λµλ −+= 1,,  for the pure receiving region and 
( ) ( )kukskuk xwwL λ−= 12,, , with k=h,f and ff. 
 
                                                 
8
 Also in this case, we can extend the analysis on the study of three groups of regions. 
9
 Labour costs in 2006 varied by one to twenty in the EU27. Expressed in euro, the average 
hourly labour costs in the EU27 in 2006 was euro 20.35. Sweden (e32.16) had the highest 
hourly labour cost in 2006, followed by Denmark (e31.98 in 2005), Luxembourg (e31.98) 
and Belgium (e31.58). Bulgaria (e1.65), Romania (e2.68), Latvia (e3.41) and Lithuania 
(e4.21) had the lowest. Within the structure of the labour costs, the highest share of social 
security costs paid by the employer was found in Sweden (30.6%), followed by Belgium 
(30.3%) and France (28.6%) and the lowest shares in Malta (6.9%), Denmark (10.9%), 
Slovenia (13.4%) and Cyprus (15.1%). (Eurostat Yearbook 2008). 
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According the previous sections, we study the condition to have in region h, f and ff, 
unchanged education and migration incentives when the barriers to migrate decrease. 
 
First, let us analyse the pure sending country h, the conditions are the same identified in 
equation (10). 
 
Second, let us analyse the sending and receiving country f.  
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Third, let us analyse the pure receiving country ff. 
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Also in this case, we can study two possible scenario: a) Government of ff does not change 
the tax to educated; b) Government of ff does not change the tax to non-educated. 
 
Scenario a (migration and fiscal policies) 0=∂
∂
m
t sff
. 
In the first case, by the equation (20), implies that 
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The same results and comments analysed in equation (14). 
Let us study in this scenario the region f by studying the system (19) 
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By definition, ( ) 0,* <
∂
∂
m
mic k
 then 0<∂
∂
m
t sf
. The receiving and sending region f, in order to 
compensate lower barriers to migration, has to decreasing the taxation of skilled workers. 
 
Furthermore, the sign of the provision of the public good education is given by 
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In particular, if ( )( ) ( ) fffhh
r
r λλµµλ
+
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<+−
1
211  (i.e. the net level of skilled in f 
(migrated and native) is very low) then lower barriers to migration imply 0<∂
∂
m
s f
. 
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Finally, the sign of the tax to unskilled is given by ( ) ( ) 
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and native) is lower than the quota of skilled born in f) then lower barriers to migration 
imply that 0>∂
∂
m
t uh
. Also in this case, note that the more costly it is to acquire education 
(the higher r), the worse is the redistribution of resource to the unskilled. 
 
Let us study in this scenario the region h by studying the system (10) 
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Analysing the sign of the variables, we derive that 0<∂
∂
m
t sh
, 0>∂
∂
m
sh
 if 
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m
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 if ( )rh +< 1
1µ .  
 
Scenario b (fiscal and migration policies with redistributive constraints) 0=∂
∂
m
t uff
. 
In this scenario the results are similar to those analysed in the previous section, let us so 
compare only the difference in the tax to skilled. 
 
( ) 0
1
1
>






+
+−
=∂
∂
r
r
w
m
t
ffff
s
ff
s
ff
λµλ
ϑ
                  [24] 
The government of ff compensates the increasing cost in migration policies by increasing 
the taxation of .skilled and by increasing the provision of public education. In particular, 
higher is the quota of skilled workers in ff (natives and foreign), lower is the increasing in 
the skilled taxation and the increasing of publicly education. 
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The sign of these variables is the opposite of the previous case when 
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region cover the decreasing migration costs) In this case 0>∂
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Analysing the BD in EU, we discover that we have a bi-directional phenomenon. From one 
side the EU suffer strong “drain” of his scientist and from the other side the EU is an 
important “pole of attraction” of the BD from several LDCs and from the other European 
countries. To analyse this duality of the European BD, we presented two different 
specification of a simple theoretical model. 
 
In the first specification we analysed the first characteristic of the European BD: the 
simultaneous presence of regions which attract skilled (i.e. former EU, f in the model) and 
of regions which provide skilled (i.e. new EU’s entrants, h in the model). The solutions of 
this analysis is summarized in the table (1) which shows the policies that the two regions 
will implement in order to maintain educational incentives without leading to more 
emigration when mobility costs become lower by migration policies of the sending country. 
 
[HERE TABLE 1] 
 
In particular, equations (14) and (15) analyse the case in which the sending region invest 
more resources in order to attract skilled. Because the tax rate on skilled of f does not 
change (i.e. the resources for these policies derive from higher taxation to unskilled and 
lower investment in education) we define this scenario the migration competition one. In 
this case the sending country, in order to sterilize the migration policies of f is forced to 
decrease the tax rate on skilled (in order to increase the incentives to stay at home) and to 
implement a combination of lower taxation of skilled workers and reduced educational 
subsidies. Only if the region h has sufficient resources to maintain educational incentives 
without leading to more emigration when mobility costs become lower then will be a 
scenario where in both regions the increasing mobility implies low redistribution of income 
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and lower investment in education. According to the literature, we assist to an increasing in 
the taxation of the immobile factor and a decreasing of the mobile one. On the contrary, 
when the sending region is not more able to contrast the migration policies of f, then the 
market will move to a new equilibrium where the receiving region gains from new flows of 
skilled (and repays the investment in migration policies) and the sending region is forced to 
reduce more the redistributive policies and the investment in education because it is not 
able to capture an increasing part of these investments. 
 
Furthermore, equations (16) and (17) analyse the case in which the sending region invest 
more resources in order to attract skilled but do not change the taxation on unskilled. This 
case is equivalent to assume that these region is forced to maintain a given level of 
investment in education (i.e. the European Commission define a minimum level of 
investment in R&D for the receiving country). Consequently, to cover the new expenses on 
migration policies  the region f is forced to increase the level of taxation on skilled and, to 
maintain unchanged the incentives to education, to increase the investment in education. 
We define this the migration competition with redistributive constraints scenario. Also in 
this case the sending country, in order to sterilize the migration policies of f is forced to 
decrease the tax rate on skilled and implement a combination of lower taxation of skilled 
workers and reduced educational subsidies as before but less than the case without 
educational investment constraints. This second scenario capture s the positive impact of  
the presence of a Central Authority which impose a minimum level of provision of the 
public good education of the receiving country. 
 
In the second specification of the model, we analyse the second characteristic of the 
European BD, the presence of regions which are simultaneously receiving (by attracting 
skilled, f in the model) and sending countries (attracted by higher productive regions i.e. the 
U.S.A., ff in the model) and regions which are pure sending countries (h). Both the 
receiving countries (f and ff) could increase, by investing resources, the level of integration 
between countries and to reduce the level of migration costs. The solutions of this analysis 
is summarized in the table (2) which compares the skilled’s taxation policies that the three 
regions will implement in order to maintain educational incentives without leading to more 
emigration when mobility costs become lower by migration policies of both sending 
countries. 
 
[HERE TABLE 2] 
 
In particular, the first column compares the migration competition scenario analysed in the 
two regions’ model with the migration and fiscal competition scenario analysed in the three 
regions’ model. The presence of a new “pure receiving” country which is able to implement 
migration policies to attract skilled form f obligates this one to sterilize the ff migration 
policies by invest itself into new migration policies (in order to attract skilled from h) and 
to decrease the tax rate on skilled (in order to sterilize the lower barriers to migrate). The 
combination of these policies (migration and fiscal) increase the final effect on the pure 
sending country h which must reduce the skilled’s tax more than f in order to sterilize both 
migration policies of f and ff and the fiscal policies of f. As in the previous case, the final 
result for who looses skilled workers are lower investment in education and lower 
redistributive policies. 
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Moreover, the second column compares the migration competition with redistributive 
constraints scenario analysed in the two regions’ model with the migration with 
redistributive constraints scenario analysed in the three regions’ model. As in the previous 
case, the final result for who loose skilled workers are lower investment in education and 
lower redistributive policies. 
 
In both scenarios, the key element is the possibility for the higher productivity regions to 
implement migration policies in order to increase the flow of skilled workers attracted. 
These policies imply the investment of resources which are moved from redistributive 
policies and from the educational investments. Furthermore, each “Brain attractor” my be 
tempted to adopt free riding behaviour by decreasing the investment in education of the 
native agents and by attracting more skilled workers educated abroad by invest in m. In our 
model, this possibility is clearly captured by the result showed in the first column of Table 
1. Moreover, we analysed the model at equilibrium by assuming that the sending region is 
able to implement policies that guarantee unchanged migration and educational decisions. 
When h has not  sufficient resources to sterilized longer these migration and fiscal policies, 
then this one is forced to follow the same “auto destructive mechanism” started by f, to 
decrease the skilled’s taxation and to continue the “rice to bottom” in the provision of the 
public education. This dangerous effect is well know from EU institutions which suggested 
to define a target in the investment in education and research, the Lisbon Strategy. In 
particular, the subsequent Spring European Councils (Lisbon 2000, Stockholm 2001, 
Barcelona 2002 and Brussels in 2003) agreed that overall spending on R&D in the Union 
should be increased with the aim of approaching 3% of GDP by 2010. Moreover, only 
Finland and Sweden have reached this goal. For the whole union to hit the target by 2010, 
R&D investment must grow by 8% a year, nearly twice the 4.5% annual increase recorded 
since 1997 (COM 2001a, COM 2001b and COM 2003).  
 
To capture the impact of the EU area of the minimum target of investment in research, we 
analysed (see the second column of the Table 1) the case in which the receiving country 
does not change their redistributive policies. This assumption implies that the receiving 
country is forced to subsidy the migration policies by augmenting the taxation to educated 
and (to maintain unchanged the educational incentives) to increase the level of publicly 
education. In this way the minimum level of investment in R&D can be assured. Let us note 
that the increment of educational subsidies could be used as instrument of migration 
competition. In exemplum Portugal has increased the number of mobility fellowships for 
incoming foreign researchers by 50% from 1994 to 1999. Finland has bilateral research 
exchange schemes with many of the candidate countries. Almost 50% of Luxembourg’s 
national research grants are allocated to non-nationals. Finally Germany, UK, France, 
Netherlands and Denmark have research grants and fellowships for increase the presence of 
non national researchers .   
 
Furthermore, the second specification of the model help us to capture better the migration 
competition phenomenon inside the EU by assuming that both the receiving countries (f 
and ff in the model) implement uncoordinated migration policies in order to increase the 
flow of skilled migrated from h. Also n this case, free riding behaviours of the receiving 
countries may start a perverse migration competition in order to attract more and more 
skilled as substitute of the native skilled which require investment in education to be 
created. This result is captured by the model solutions (see Table 2), where the region f 
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decrease the level of taxation to educated and consequently decrease the amount of 
resources invested to subsidy the education. There are several examples of countries that 
providing tax reductions specifically for researchers: Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and 
France. In particular, Denmark and Sweden outstanding researcher tax reduction for up 3 
years from 40% to 25%, moreover, in  Netherlands, speciality workers compensated with a 
rebate of 30% of total earned during stay. Other countries, like Austria and UK, provide 
different policies for highly skilled specialist. Furthermore, a recent a study carried out for 
the French Senate tells of a “discouraging landscape of administrative convolution, heavy 
taxes and inflexible labour legislation”. The negative part for the sending countries of this 
migration policies is increased by the fact that these ones are uncoordinated between the 
receiving countries.  The impact of this migration competition is showed in the model 
solutions (Table 2) by the presence two decreasing in the migration costs that the sending 
regions have to sterilize. Examples of migration policies as answer to other similar policies 
are several. For example, France in 2004 introduced tax deductions for highly skilled 
migrants and this reform was explicitly motivated by the fact that Belgium had adopted 
policies encouraging inflows of highly skilled workers; similarly, the British ad hoc scheme 
for highly skilled migrants was motivated referring to the measures being taken in 
Germany, etc. Furthermore, this specific competition in migration policies was also evident 
when the EU-15 adjusted their regulations on work permits in the eve of the Eastern 
Enlargement. Furthermore, some countries implement marketing and recruiting policies 
directly oriented to attract foreign researchers by compete to other regions. For exemplum, 
in some countries, such as France, the Netherlands, Finland and the UK, there are nation-
wide integrated Internet sites on opportunities and regulations. In France, the Kastler 
Foundation provides personalised assistance to researchers from abroad. Though not 
always a requirement, it is common practise in many Member States to publish research 
vacancies internationally. In the UK, open recruitment is common practice with some 
schemes supporting the costs of recruiting outstanding researchers from industry or 
overseas. In some research funding organisations in Member States (e.g. Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden), foreign participation in recruitment and/or evaluation committees is compulsory 
or facilitated by requiring applications to be written in a ‘world’ language. The Department 
for Education and Employment launched the UK Education Brand which marked the 
beginning of a three-year programme to raise the profile overseas of UK education. The 
Brand, together with generic marketing materials, supports promotion activities overseas of 
UK higher education institutions. The budget put towards this initiative is 7.8 million EUR. 
Furthermore, an example of policy studied for the return of migrants to their source country 
is the so called “Irish Christmas recruitment”. The Irish Ministers of Enterprise Trade and 
Development are recruiting expatriates to return to build the software industry; targeting 
those returning home for Christmas . In France and Finland there is a unified body for the 
international marketing . In Italy, the Government is trying to turn the Brain Drain into a 
gain. The so-called operation ‘Brain Buster’, launched by the MIUR aimed to attract back 
Italian scientists and/or foreign academics working in the research sector abroad. Finally, 
some of these policies of recruiting are specifically devoted to the former eastern bloc 
countries. In exemplum, Germany, Austria and France are actively recruiting undergraduate 
and post-graduate science students from Poland and other former eastern bloc countries. 
First indications suggest that Germany and Austria are now the top choice for many of the 
brightest foreign students, who are being offered incentives such as university courses in 
English and favourable funding schemes. 
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Concluding this article, data show that in EU there exist bi-directional flow of skilled 
migrants and differences in the labour productivity between regions. These two elements 
implies that the receiving and the sending and receiving countries implement several 
migration policies in order to increase their capacity to be a pole of attraction for the skilled 
workers. In many case these policies implied a “migration competition” between the 
receiving countries which attract the skilled from the same basin  (i.e. the Eastern 
countries). In this article, we replicate these dynamics and, according to the economics 
literature, we demonstrate that these migration policies and this migration competition 
imply a worst equilibrium in which there is lower redistribution and lower provision of the 
public good education. Furthermore, in both versions of the model, we demonstrate that the 
introduction of a central authority, which stop the “rice to bottom” in the provision of 
subsidies to education by target a minimum level of R&D, may reduce or block some 
negative impact of these policies both in the sending both in the receiving country. This 
result is in line to the Lisbon strategy proposed by the EU Commission. Finally, we show 
another crucial role for the EU. In the second specification of the model , we introduce the 
necessity that the EU coordinates these migration policies in order to avoid the possible 
negative effects of the “migration competition” inside the Union, but, until now, there is not 
tentative to coordinate these migration policies. 
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TABLE 1 
 
TWO REGIONS 
Sending Region h Receiving Region f 
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Migration Competition with redistributive constraints 
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TABLE 2 
 
Two Regions 
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